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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                                        
No. 05-5208
                                                        
PHU VAN NGUYEN,
Appellant
vs.
SUPERINTENDENT GRACE OF SCI HUNTINGDON;
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF BERKS COUNTY;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
____________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01241) 
District Judge:   Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 10, 2007
Before:  SLOVITER, WEIS and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 17, 2007)
______________
OPINION 
                              
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
The issue in this case is whether defense counsel in a Pennsylvania burglary
prosecution provided ineffective assistance to appellant Phu Van Nguyen by not carrying
2out a more aggressive cross-examination of a crucial identification witness, Ms. Kieu
Lam.
Nguyen and a few accomplices invaded the Lam residence and robbed Ms.
Lam of jewelry.  A few weeks later, Ms. Lam saw a television news program depicting
Nguyen and another man because they were wanted on suspicion of murder in a
neighboring county.  She notified the police that the other man pictured had participated
in the robbery of her home.  She did not identify Nguyen at that time. One year later,
however, she again contacted the police and advised them that she believed that the
second man in the television report was also one of those who had burglarized her home. 
She subsequently identified Nguyen from a photo line-up provided by police. 
At the burglary trial, Ms. Lam identified Nguyen as one of the culprits.  On
cross-examination, defense counsel asked Ms. Lam if she had seen a picture of Nguyen a
few weeks after the burglary and had failed to recognize him at that time.  When the trial
judge attempted to clarify the question for Ms. Lam, defense counsel advised the trial
judge at sidebar that further inquiry might reveal that Ms. Lam saw the picture of Nguyen
on the news program about the murder.  Counsel stated his fear that pursuing Ms. Lam’s
failure to disclose that she had initially failed to identify the defendant on the television
program would open the door to the prosecution to explore the details of the program to
the detriment of the defendant.  The trial judge indicated that the prosecution might be
allowed to examine Ms. Lam about the television episode if further inquiry along those
3lines took place.  
Defense counsel then returned to the examination and asked Ms. Lam if
more than a year had elapsed between the burglary and her statement to the police about
the defendant’s identity.  She conceded that it had.  She did not testify about the television
news program.  No further questions were directed to Ms. Lam.
On direct appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, Nguyen,  with a
new lawyer, raised the issue of ineffective assistance at trial.  The Superior Court
approved the sentence but remanded for a hearing on the ineffective assistance issue.
After a hearing in the Common Pleas Court, the trial judge concluded that
the defendant had failed to show that counsel was ineffective.  The Superior Court
reviewed that ruling in detail and stated, “we do not attempt to second guess such
judgment calls by trial counsel. . . . [In this case,] we cannot say that counsel’s actions
were without a reasonable basis.”
We agree with the Superior Court that ineffectiveness of trial counsel is not
determined by hindsight.  When the lawyer is confronted with the choice between an
aggressive cross-examination that could reveal damaging information about their client
and a succinct one that establishes critical information without the danger of introducing
other criminal conduct,  the courts should defer to counsel’s decision.  See Strickland v.
Washingotn, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (noting that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential” and that “a court must indulge a strong
4presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance”).  The trial judge here, who was intimately familiar with the circumstances,
concluded that counsel had a reasonable basis for his actions.  
Trial technique manuals are replete with instances where that “one last
question” on cross-examination resulted in adverse results.  We cannot fault the trial
lawyer in this case for declining further questioning that might well have opened the door
for the prosecution to explore the issue in detail.
We agree with the District Court that habeas corpus relief is not appropriate
here.
Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
